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ESSAY
RJR NABISCO AND THE RUNAWAY CANON
Maggie Gardner*
N last term's RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community,' the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the private remedy in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") 2 does not extend to foreign injuries, even if those injuries were caused by a U.S. company operating within the United States.3 In doing so, the Court finished
transforming the presumption against extraterritoriality from a tool
meant to effectuate congressional intent into a tool for keeping Congress
in check. The presumption against extraterritoriality has become a
means for judges (particularly Justices) to override Congress in defining
the proper scope of litigation in U.S. courts.
The RJR Nabisco case, like many transnational cases, was both global
and local in scope. The European Community and twenty-six of its
member states had been investigating major tobacco companies for their
role in cigarette trafficking and money laundering into and through Europe.4 While other tobacco companies eventually reached settlements
with the European Commission, RJR Nabisco did not and continuedaccording to the European Community's complaint-to engage in illegal
activity, 5 specifically by scheming "to sell cigarettes to and through
* Climenko Fellow and Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School.
1136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016).
2 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2012).
3 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2111.
4

Brief for Respondents at 6, RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. 2090 (No. 15-138), 2016 WL
447643, at *6.
5 Id. at 7-8.
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criminal organizations and to accept criminal proceeds in payment for
cigarettes. ,6 This conduct was causing harm in Europe, but the European
Community believed it was "directed and controlled" by "[h]igh-level
managers and employees" from RJR Nabisco's headquarters in the
United States.7
The Supreme Court threw out the lawsuit after invoking the presumption against extraterritoriality. That canon of statutory interpretation instructs judges to assume "that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary
intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States."8 In applying the presumption in RJR Nabisco, however, a majority of four Justices 9 rejected multiple indications that Congress intended RICO's private right of action to extend abroad l while
raising the bar on what Congress must do to make its extraterritorial expectations clear."
Besides the worrisome implications for separation of powers, the majority's opinion was also disappointing on practical grounds. By applying the presumption too aggressively, the Court missed an opportunity to
provide much-needed guidance to judges on how to interpret statutes
that rebut the presumption. For despite the Court's recent wariness of
extraterritorial laws, 12 Congress does sometimes intend its statutes to apply abroad. 13 Those extraterritorial statutes nonetheless have limits-but
6

Id. at 9 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For example, the European

Community alleged that RJR Nabisco was "knowingly sell[ing] their products to organized
crime, arrang[ing] for secret payments from organized crime, and launder[ing] such proceeds
in the United States or offshore venues known for bank secrecy." Id. (alterations in original)
(citation omitted).
7
Id. at 9-11.
8
Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248
(1991) (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
9 Justice Sotomayor took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. RJR Nabisco,
136 S. Ct. at 2096. With a seat vacant following the death of Justice Scalia, a Court of seven
decided the case.
10See infra Section II.A.
ll See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2090, 2101, 2106, 2108; see also infra Section II.B.
12In addition to RJR Nabisco, see, for example, Morrison v. NationalAustralia Bank
Ltd.,
561 U.S. 247 (2010), and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).

13The Court has recognized that some statutes, like the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7,
and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, apply extraterritorially. See, e.g., F. Hoffmann-La
Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 173 (2004) (Sherman Act); Pfizer Inc. v. Gov't
of India, 434 U.S. 308, 312 (1978) (Sherman and Clayton Acts); id. at 320 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (Sherman and Clayton Acts). On other occasions, when the Court has interpreted
statutes not to apply extraterritorially, Congress has amended those statutes to make its extraterritorial intent clear. See, e.g., Zachary D. Clopton, Replacing the Presumption Against Ex-
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the Court has not clearly explained how judges are to identify them.
Without such guidance, judges may be tempted to cling too tightly to the
presumption in order to avoid the doctrinal black hole on the other side.
This Essay thus concludes with advice to judges about how to interpret statutes that do indicate Congress's extraterritorial intent: First,
while judges are bound by RJR Nabisco's holding, they should not feel
obligated to repeat its problematic modes of reasoning."i Second, judges
should not be wary of finding the presumption rebutted for fear of what
comes next. On the one hand, there are other doctrines that can help
judges navigate jurisdictional conflict; on the other, extraterritorial statutes on their own terms have outer limits, and the Court has provided
clues elsewhere for howjudges might identify them. 16

I. THE MODERN PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY
Though considered a "longstanding principle of American law,"' the
presumption against extraterritoriality fell into disuse after the 1940s.18
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, published in 1987,
did not even bother to include it. 19 But starting in the 1990s, the
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts turned back to the presumption as a
means for curbing the scope of transnational litigation in U.S. courts.20
traterritoriality, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 13-15 (2014) (discussing Congress's response to Aramco
and Morrison, among other examples).
14The closest direction might be Empagran, discussed below in Section II.B, but the discussion in Empagran was not explicitly tied to the presumption against extraterritoriality.
15 See infra Section III.A.
16 See infra Section III.B.
17Equal Emp't Opportunity Comn'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244,
248 (1991).
18See William S. Dodge, The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality in Two Steps, 110
Am. J. Int'l L.Unbound 45, 45 n.1 (2016).
19See Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law 27 (Am. Law Inst., Tentative Draft
No. 2, 2016); Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law 27 (Am. Law Inst. 1987).
20 In addition to Morrison v. NationalAustralia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010), Kiobel v.

Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013), and Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, these cases
include Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454-55 (2007), and Smith v. United
States, 507 U.S. 197, 203-04 (1993), among others. See also Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation
Isolationism, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 1081, 1098-99 (2015) (framing the renewed focus on extraterritoriality as a transnational litigation avoidance strategy). For a more sympathetic view of
the Court's efforts to rein in transnational litigation, see Paul B. Stephan, Response Essay Empagran: Empire Building or Judicial Modesty?, in International Law in the U.S. Supreme
Court: Continuity and Change 553, 553 (David L. Sloss et al. eds., 2011); Paul B. Stephan,
Private Litigation as a Foreign Relations Problem, 110 Am. J. Int'l L. Unbound 40 (2016)
[hereinafter Stephan, Private Litigation as a Foreign Relations Problem].
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When the Court in 1991 breathed new life into the presumption in
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian American Oil
Co. (Aramco),2 1 however, it also transformed it. 22 On the one hand, Aramco invoked the old presumption as it had last been defined half a century earlier: It is a tool, the Court explained, "whereby unexpressed
congressional intent may be ascertained, '23 with judges looking for
"language in the [relevant Act] [that] gives any indication of a congressional purpose to extend its coverage" beyond U.S. territory. 24 But on
the other hand, and in the same breath, Aramco required an "affirmative
intention of the Congress clearly expressed" before a statute could be
construed to apply extraterritorially. 25
This language came from a separate line of cases applying the
Charming Betsy 26 canon. As Professor John Knox has explained, that
canon assumes Congress does not intend to violate international law and
thus requires Congress to indicate clearly when it is doing so. 27 This
conflation of the traditional presumption with CharmingBetsy's stricter
requirement has predictably led to the presumption increasingly resembling a clear statement rule-even while the Court continues to insist
that it is not.28 In 1993, the Court required "clear evidence of congressional intent" to overcome the presumption. 29 By 2010, the Court could
state more bluntly, "[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none., 30 And in RJR Nabisco, the Court
phrased the inquiry as how far Congress "has affirmatively and unmistakably instructed" the statute to reach. 3'

21 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
22 For a thorough account of the presumption's history and this modem turn towards a
stricter doctrine, see John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 Am.

J. Int'l L. 351, 361-76 (2010).

23 Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
24 Id. (first alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at
285).
25 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U. S.138,
147 (1957)).
26Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
27 See Knox, supra note 22, at 365-66, 374-75. In fact, Benz (the case quoted by Aramco
for this proposition) did not entail the extraterritorial application of a statute.
28 See RJR Nabisco, 136 S.Ct. at 2102; Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247,
265 (2010).
29 Smithv. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 (1993).
30 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255.
31
RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2100.
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Along the way, the Court has formalized the modem presumption into
a two-step inquiry. 32 At step one, a judge must look for this "clear indication" of extraterritorial effect. 33 If the judge does not find such an indication-that is, if the presumption is not rebutted-then the judge
continues to step two, in which she determines the "focus" of the statute. 34 For a case to fall under the statute's ambit,
its connections to the
35
United States must match the statute's "focus.
Like the ratcheting up of the language required to overcome the presumption, this two-step framework moves the presumption further away
from the purported search for congressional intent.36 As Professor Lea
Brilmayer has explained, step one requires Congress to be emphatic
when it wishes its statutes to apply abroad, while at step two, judges get
to decide what domestic contacts count in which cases (determining the
"focus" of a statute, after all, is a rather mushy directive). 37 And while it
is helpful to give judges such a clear structure for thinking about how to
handle transnational cases, that guidance has been lopsided: The Court
has not provided similar guidance on what to do when the presumption
is rebutted.38
RJR Nabisco presented such an opportunity, as the Justices unanimously agreed that RICO's substantive provisions do extend extraterritorially. 3 ' RICO targets "racketeering activity," which is comprised of
certain state or federal
criminal offenses that the RICO statute terms
"predicate acts.", 40 These predicate acts, listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961, include some crimes that explicitly reach conduct beyond U.S. borders.4'
32
33

For further discussion of this two-step framework, see Dodge, supra note 18.
RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101.

34 Id.
35 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266.

See Lea Brilmayer, New Extraterritoriality: Morrison v. NationalAustraliaBank, Legislative Supremacy, and the Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application of American
Law, 40 Sw. U. L. Rev. 655, 664 (2011) ([W]hile citing the principle of legislative supremacy, Justice Scalia's opinion [in Morrison] has actually increased the opportunity for judicial
policy making and diminished the importance of congressional preferences.").
31 See id. at 66748.
36

38 See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101 (noting that Morrison and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch

Petroleum Co. left this question unaddressed).
39 Id.

40 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2012).
41 Some of these cross-referenced statutes, for example, explicitly reach conduct that occurred "outside the United States." RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101-02 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1203(b) (2012) (hostage taking) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 1957(d)(2) (2012) (money laundering)).
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Section 1962-the heart of RICO-prohibits four different ways by
which a "pattern of racketeering activity" may be used to infiltrate, control, or operate an "enterprise., 42 Because § 1962 incorporates § 1961's
definition of racketeering activity, which in turn incorporates other explicitly extraterritorial statutes, the Court had no trouble concluding43 that
§ 1962 reaches foreign racketeering activity, at least in some cases.
The next step should have been to consider whether this extraterritorial statute was nonetheless subject to other limits, whether on its own
terms or due to other comity-based doctrines. 44 Instead, the Court announced a new requirement that the presumption be applied separately
to every statutory provision, whether substantive, remedial, or jurisdictional. 4' Based on that requirement, the four-Justice majority applied the
presumption separately to RICO's private right of action, found in
§ 1964(c), 46 and concluded that it did not independently overcome the
presumption. 47 Thus a "private RICO plaintiff.., must allege and prove
a domestic injury to its business or property., 48 That second application
of the presumption was ill considered and provides a problematic model
for the lower courts.
II. THE RUNAWAY CANON

The majority's application of the presumption to RICO's private right
of action was ill considered along at least two dimensions. First, the majority rejected two standard legislative methods by which Congress
could efficiently signal its extraterritorial intent. Second, the new requirement that Congress express its extraterritorial intent in every provision of a statute reflects an unrealistic understanding of how Congress
works. In the hands of the RJR Nabisco majority, the presumption has

42 See id. at 2097 (summarizing § 1962).
43 Id. at 2102.

44 For my thoughts on what such inquiry might look like, see infra Part III.

45 See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101, 2106. Though this requirement was initially stated

in the portion of the opinion joined by the dissenters, it is not clear that the dissenters fully
embraced it. See id. at 2113 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). For a critique of this new requirement, see infra Section II.B.
46 The majority did not explain how RICO's criminal provision, § 1963, or the civil remedies available to the government, § 1964(a) and (b), would rebut the presumption, though it
seemed to assume they would. See Anthony J. Colangelo, The Frankenstein's Monster of
Extraterritoriality
Law, 110 Am. J. Int'l L. Unbound 51, 55 (2016).
47
RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2106.

48 Id.
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become less a method for interpreting statutes than a pronouncement on
the proper scope of access to U.S. courts, a pronouncement that Congress must labor to displace.4 9
A. Ignoring CongressionalIntent
One common way that Congress indicates its geographic intent is to
incorporate by reference another statute that is more explicitly extraterritorial. Indeed, that was the basis on which the Court determined that
RICO's substantive provisions reach abroad: "The most obvious textual
clue" to § 1962's extraterritorial scope, the Justices agreed, was its incorporation of § 1961, which in turn incorporated statutes that "plainly
apply to at least some foreign conduct."5 ° "Short of an explicit declaration," Justice Alito reasoned, "it is hard to imagine how Congress could
have more clearly indicated that it intended RICO to have (some) extraterritorial effect."' 51 Yet when it came to RICO's private right of action,
the majority had no trouble imagining a very different congressional intent behind § 1964(c)'s incorporation of § 1962.52 Even though
§ 1964(c) provides a remedy for "[a]ny person injured in his business or
property by reason of a violation of section 1962, ' 5 the majority refused
to treat that incorporation of § 1962 as rebutting the presumption against
extraterritoriality. 5 4
Alternatively, the Court might have looked to Congress's decision to
model RICO's private right of action after that of the Clayton Act,
which the Supreme Court had previously held does allow recovery for
injuries suffered abroad.55 As Justice Ginsburg noted in dissent, "[t]he
similarity of language in [the two statutes] is, of course, a strong indication that [they] should be interpreted paripassu.' ,56 But that, too, the majority determined, is not sufficient to indicate Congress's intent for

49 Cf. Colangelo, supra note 46, at 51, 55 (raising similar concerns).
50

RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101.
Id. at 2102-03.
52See id. at 2113 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (critiquing the majority's reasoning for this
inconsistency); see also Pamela K. Bookman, Doubling Down on Litigation Isolationism,
110 Am. J. Int'l L. Unbound 57, 58 (2016) (same); Colangelo, supra note 46, at 54 (same).
53 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012) (emphasis added).
54
RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2108.
55 See Pfizer Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308, 313-20 (1978).
56 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2114 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (second and third alterations
in original) (quoting Northcross v. Bd. of Educ. 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973)).
51
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RICO's § 1964(c) to similarly apply to foreign harms.57 In rejecting the
statutory analogy to the Clayton Act, the majority pointed to the different definition of "person" under the Clayton Act, which explicitly extends to foreign business organizations-even though that difference had
not prevented the Court from interpreting RICO's private right of action
to align with the Clayton Act's private right of action in the past.58
To add insult to injury, the majority seized on the Clayton Act-like
language in § 1964(c) to bolster its conclusion that § 1964(c) does not
extend extraterritorially. To model RICO's private right of action after
that of the Clayton Act (which, again, the Supreme Court had previously
found extended to foreign injuries), Congress limited § 1964(c) to injuries to "business or property."' 9 Rather than treat this language as an indication of Congress's intention that the two Acts should be interpreted
similarly, the majority reasoned that this language "signaled" Congress's
intent that RICO's "civil remedy is not coextensive with [its] substantive
provisions," and thus that the remedy's geographic scope presumably
differed from that of the rest of the statute. 60 It seems that Congress cannot win.
B. Raising the Bar
In rejecting both statutory incorporation and statutory modeling as indications of congressional intent, the RJR Nabisco majority made it
harder for Congress to efficiently rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality. Nor did the majority indicate any preferable alternative, short
of a clear statement of extraterritoriality. At the same time, it introduced
a new requirement that Congress reiterate its extraterritorial intent in
every provision of a statute, whether jurisdictional, substantive, or remedial. 6 1 Even if the Court's view of congressional intent (and ability) were
realistic, it keeps moving the goal further down the field. The result is

57

Id.at 2109-11 (majority opinion).

58 Justice Ginsburg identified three other occasions on which the Court had interpreted

RICO's § 1964(c) to align with § 4 of the Clayton Act. See id. at 2114 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). As a further irony, the majority's focus on the definition of "person" suggests that § 4
of the Clayton Act extends extraterritorially because it incorporates another extraterritorial
provision (the definition of "person"), even though the majority had just rejected a similar
interpretive move for § 1964(c).
59 18 U.S.C. 1964(c) (2012).

60RJR Nabisco, 136 S.Ct. at 2108-09 (majority opinion).
61

Id. at 2101, 2106.
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not a search for congressional intent, but an effort to put the brakes on
what Congress can do.
The Court seems to presume that it is not difficult for Congress to
state its extraterritorial intent, but that ignores several realities. First
there is the difficulty of the drafting process itself (and the inertia for
amending misinterpreted statutes). 63 Professors Abbe Gluck and Lisa
Bressman have also shown that congressional staffers are simply not
aware of such judicially required clear-statement rules. 64 And then there
is the possibility of introducing more unintended errors the more that
Congress does say explicitly. For example, Congress tried to overturn in
part the Court's narrowly territorial interpretation of the Securities Exchange Act in Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd.,65 but there is
some question whether its amendment to the Securities Exchange Act
was phrased and framed correctly to achieve this purpose. 66 After all,
providing the clear statement that the Court seems to want is not as simple as stating "this provision applies extraterritorially." Drafters have to
account for the limits on U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction under international law, limits that courts may sometimes be better situated to interpret and apply through the Charming Betsy canon.
Further, the Court's new insistence that judges seek such clear extraterritorial intent in every provision is ill-advised (and one is to hope
short-lived). As Professor Bill Dodge has cogently argued, applying the
presumption to jurisdictional provisions would be deeply disruptive, as
well as irreconcilable with the Court's reasoning in other recent casesincluding other portions of RJR Nabisco itself.67 It also cannot possibly
reflect existing congressional intent, as Congress has not been in the
habit of writing extraterritoriality into the separate jurisdictional and remedial provisions of statutory schemes that are unarguably intended to
62

As Professor Pam Bookman puts it, "[i]t
is... hard to argue that the presumption tracks

congressional intent when it keeps raising the hurdle that Congress must clear in order to rebut it." Bookman, supra note 52, at 61.
63 See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the
Inside-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I,
65 Stan. L. Rev. 901, 912 (2013).
64 See id. at 945.
65 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
66See Stephan, Private Litigation as a Foreign Relations Problem, supra note 20, at 42 n.9
(citing SEC v. Chi. Convention Ctr., LLC, 961 F. Supp. 2d 905, 909-17 (N.D. Ill. 2013)).
67 William S. Dodge, The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Still Does Not Apply to
Jurisdictional Statutes, Opinio Juris (July 1, 2016), http://opiniojuris.org/2016/07/01/32658/
[https://perma.cc/T59G-BC3U].
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be extraterritorial in scope. As Professors Hannah Buxbaum and Pam
Bookman have noted, for example, when Congress overrode the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of Title VII in Aramco by revising
the law to clarify its extraterritorial reach, it did not separately clarify the
extraterritorial reach of the law's remedial provisions.68 If RJR Nabisco
were applied strictly, then, that clear congressional intent behind the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 would be nullified.
In short, the presumption has run away from its stated purpose of effectuating congressional intent. Instead it is generating an ever-growing
series of hoops through which Congress must jump if it wants its laws to
extend beyond U.S. borders.6 9 In applying this transformed presumption,
the Supreme Court poses as a faithful agent of congressional intent, but
it is in fact a disciplinarian of Congress's global aspirations.
III. WHAT COMES NEXT

In overextending the presumption against extraterritoriality in RJR
Nabisco, the Court missed an opportunity to give judges better guidance
on what can rebut the presumption, and if it is rebutted, what happens
next. This final Part offers some suggestions about what judges might do
to help bring this runaway canon back home.
A. Applying the Presumption
When applying the presumption to other statutes in the future, the best
option for judges is to do what the Court says in RJR Nabisco, not what
it does. The majority's rhetoric does not constrain the lower courts, and
the modes of reasoning the majority used or discounted do not dictate
the modes of reasoning lower courts must use when analyzing other
statutes.70
First, RJR Nabisco should not be read as casting doubt on the relevance of incorporated statutes or analogous statutes in determining congressional intent. Indeed, judges need only look to the Court's analysis
68 See Bookman, supra note 52, at 59; Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Scope and Limitations of

the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 110 Am. J. Int'l L. Unbound 62, 64 (2016).
69 For a similar view, see Colangelo, supra note 46, at 55 ("[T]he canon has taken on a life
of its own, and now seems simply to run roughshod over anything that stands in the way of
its myopic quest to quash the private right of action in transnational cases.").
70 See generally Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104
Geo. L.J. 921, 925-27 (2016) (arguing that lower courts can legitimately narrow Supreme
Court precedent through reasonable application of its directives).
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of § 1962 to confirm the continued viability of statutory incorporation as
a means for Congress to indicate the extraterritorial scope of a statute.
Second, judges should be wary of repeating the majority's vague
functional concerns about foreign relations. At the outset of its analysis
of § 1964(c), the RJR Nabisco majority seemed to suggest that the presumption should be applied more rigorously when there is a danger of
"international friction" or "risk of conflict" with foreign law.7 This passage was largely rhetorical-a calling out of the seemingly inconsistent
positions of European governments in this and other cases involving the
presumption against extraterritoriality 7 2 (a point to which we will return73 ). Whatever its purpose, that language risks a dangerous ratcheting
up of an already strict presumption. To the extent the general concern is
legitimate-that courts should try to promote international comity by
avoiding controversy-that concern is already embodied in the presumption itself, which is meant to help prevent unintentional discord with
other nations. 74 There is no need to apply the presumption more rigorously when comity is at stake, as the presumption assumes comity is always at stake when U.S. law applies outside of U.S. territory.
Besides which, friction and comity cut both ways: Worse international discord might be caused by denying foreign plaintiffs remedies for the
wrongdoing of U.S. nationals, including on U.S. territory, while at the
same time allowing U.S. plaintiffs to sue foreign defendants for comparable conduct. 75 As Justice Ginsburg explained in dissent, "[m]aking
such litigation available to domestic but not foreign plaintiffs is hardly
solicitous of international comity or respectful of foreign interests. "76
Rather, the better place to address specific comity concerns is in the
post-presumption analysis.
71See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2107 ("[W]here such a risk is evident, the need to en-

force the presumption is at its apex.").
72See id. at 2106-08.

73 See infra Section III.B.

74 See, e.g., Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248.

75 See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2115-16 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Cassandra Burke Robertson, Foreign Plaintiffs and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality,
PrawfsBlawg (June 20, 2016), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/ 2016/06/foreign-

plaintiffs-and-the -pre sumption-against-extraterritoriality.htm

[https ://perma.cc/9M2X-FV

DY] (raising a similar point in response to RJR Nabisco); Ralf Michaels, Main Essay-

Empagran's Empire: International Law and Statutory Interpretation in the U.S. Supreme
Court of the Twenty-First Century, in International Law in the U.S. Supreme Court: Continuity and Change, supra note 20, at 533, 544 (raising the concern more generally).
76 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2115 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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B. What Happens Next
In applying the presumption, then, judges should not be afraid to find
it is rebutted. While the Supreme Court has not clarified what the postpresumption analysis should look like,7 7 the landscape on the other side
of the presumption is not quite as messy as it might at first appear. Here
are four guideposts for managing that analysis.
First, a point about semantics. The Court suggested in Microsoft
Corp. v. AT&T Corp. that the presumption against extraterritoriality continues to apply even when a statute is explicitly extraterritorial; in that
instance, the Court said, the presumption "remains instructive in determining the extent of the statutory exception."" This is a question of labels, and saying a presumption applies after it has been rebutted will ononly sow confusion. Rather, the Court's analysis in Microsoft turned on
F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A., 79 a case that did not discuss the presumption against extraterritoriality as such. Both Microsoft
and Empagran are really cases about how to interpret statutes that rebut
the presumption, and the language used to identify that analysis should
signal as much.
Which brings us to a second point: The post-presumption analysis is
still a question of statutory interpretation.80 The Court in RJR Nabisco
helpfully clarified that a statute's "focus," invoked at step two of the
Morrison framework, is irrelevant to interpreting the scope of an extraterritorial law.8 Instead, the relevant canon post-presumption is the
CharmingBetsy canon, or the assumption that Congress does not legislate beyond the bounds of international law. Under international law,
there are generally accepted limits on a nation's prescriptive (or lawmaking) power. Most traditionally, countries can assert prescriptive jurisdiction over their nationals, their territory, and ships flying their flag;
77See id. at 2101 (majority opinion) (noting that Morrison and Kiobel did not address this
question).

78 550 U.S. 437, 455-56 (2007).
7'542 U.S. 155 (2004).
80 See, e.g., RJR Nabisco, 136 S.Ct. at 2101 ("The scope of an extraterritorial statute thus

turns on the limits Congress has (or has not) imposed on the statute's foreign application . .
81 Id.
82 See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814-15 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting); cf. Clopton, supra note 13, at 22-29 (arguing that the presumption against extraterritoriality should be replaced in civil litigation with an emphasis on the Charming Betsy
canon).
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countries may also legislate regarding harm to their nationals or threats
to their security; and all countries can legislate regarding a set of universal crimes.83 When a particular interpretation of an extraterritorial statute
would exceed these bases of jurisdiction under international law, judges
should presume that was not Congress's intent absent a clear statement.
The third point is that this rather clear outer limit from Charming
Betsy-when combined with other doctrines like personal jurisdiction
that help define the scope of transnational litigation in U.S. courts-will
adequately help judges resolve most cases. Cases involving the extraterritorial application of federal statutes will often fall comfortably within
the core jurisdictional zones of U.S. power. When cases stretch those
limits, Charming Betsy provides a hard stop. Meanwhile, other doctrines
can also help address comity concerns;8 4 indeed, some of these doctrines
have themselves been refined in recent years to better account for international comity.85 As emphasized by Justice Ginsburg in her RJR
Nabisco dissent, for example, the recent contraction of general jurisdiction will limit the risk that foreign defendants with thin ties to the United
States can be hauled before U.S. courts.8 6 Between those constitutional
due process limits and international limits on prescriptive jurisdiction (as
filtered through the Charming Betsy canon), there should be few cases
that raise otherwise unaddressed comity concerns.
But what should judges do if confronted with one of those few remaining cases? This brings us to the fourth point, which is also the most
speculative. One could read the Court's opinions in Empagran and Microsoft as suggesting that an additional, Charming Betsy-inflected inquiry might apply to these zones of jurisdictional conflict.8 7 The limits
83 For a standard account, see Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 402 (Am.
Law Inst. 1987).
84 Cf. Buxbaum, supra note 68, at 65 (noting the relevance of other comity doctrines).
85 For discussions of these doctrinal developments, see Bookman, supra note 20; Stephen
B. Burbank, International Civil Litigation in U.S. Courts: Becoming a Paper Tiger?, 33 U.
Pa. J. Int'l L. 663 (2012); Maggie Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, 92 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. (forthcoming 2017).
86 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2115 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). A clearer doctrine for evaluating the import of parallel foreign litigation would help as well. See Gardner, supra note 85.
Justice Ginsburg also invoked in her dissent the doctrine of forum non conveniens, RJR
Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2115 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), but as I argue elsewhere, that doctrine
is outdated, unhelpful, and only obfuscates the comity analysis, see Gardner, supra note 85.
87 The following approach has much in common with that proposed by the draft Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law. See Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law
§ 204 (Am. Law Inst., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016) (proposing that "U.S. courts may inter-
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under international law are not always clear-cut, and the closer one approaches to those limits, the more likely one will cause consternation
among nations whose core jurisdictional prerogatives-such as their
own territorial jurisdiction-are affected.8 8 This gray zone at the edge of
permissible exercises of jurisdiction was the source of the Court's unease in Empagranand Microsoft.
In Empagran,for example, the Court had to determine whether a provision of the Sherman Act (which is explicitly extraterritorial) extended
to foreign injuries caused primarily by the foreign conduct of foreign actors that also (but separately) caused domestic injuries.8 9 In holding that
it did not, the Court asserted that it "ordinarily construes ambiguous
statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority
of other nations," and it suggested there is a "rule of statutory construction" that "cautions courts to assume that legislators take account of the
legitimate sovereign interests of other nations when they write American
laws."90 Though this formulation is unhelpfully vague, the Court was
groping for a way to put some softer outer limits on U.S. law (as its reference to the Charming Betsy canon suggests).9 ' The idea is that, even
without a direct conflict with international law (which could only be
overcome by a clear statement of Congress), judges should still be wary
of interpreting statutes as reaching right up to those outer limits because
doing so can infringe on the widely recognized sovereign interests of
other states.
When it comes to effectuating this idea, however, Empagran did not
provide a workable framework. As the Empagran Court seemed to recognize, this should not be an open-ended balancing or a vague standard
that allows functional concerns (like the risk of "international friction")
to balloon over time.92 Indeed, the malleability of such generalized funcpret federal statutory provisions to include other limitations on their applicability as a matter
of prescriptive comity" in order "[t]o avoid unreasonable interference with the legitimate
sovereign authority of other states").
88 For a discussion of these controversial margins, see Maggie Gardner, Channeling Unilateralism, 56 Harv. Int'l L.J. 297, 303-06 (2015).
89 See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 159-60. For a critique of the Court's characterization of the
dispute in Empagran, see Michaels, supra note 75, at 539-40.
9°Empagran, 542 U.S. at 164.
91 See id.; see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814-18 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (similarly groping).
92 See William S. Dodge, Response Essay - Loose Canons: International Law and Statutory Interpretation in the Twenty-First Century, in International Law in the U.S. Supreme
Court: Continuity and Change, supra note 20, at 547, 549 n. 18 (noting that Empagranreject-
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tional concerns has led the Court to curtail their relevance in other foreign relations doctrines, like the act of state doctrine93 and the political
question doctrine.9 4 Under those doctrines, judges' protestations about
their incompetence in foreign affairs had led not to greater deference to
the political branches, but to the growth of judicial power as judges too
readily decided not to decide cases.95 Similarly here, broadly phrased
concerns about "unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority
of other nations"9 6 could encourage judges to back too quickly away
from cases that Congress (and those other nations) would really rather
they keep.
Rather, the inquiry should still be tied to methods of statutory interpretation: When the case for the exercise of U.S. prescriptive jurisdiction
under international law becomes attenuated, then judges should look
more searchingly for clues that Congress did, indeed, mean to legislate
that far.97 That is, functional concerns justify the inquiry but do not
themselves resolve it. And if congressional intent for a statute to apply
in a particular context is clear, functional concerns should not override

ed case-by-case balancing); see also Michaels, supra note 75, at 535 (critiquing Empagran
for nonetheless replacing international law concerns about actual conflicts with international
relations concerns about potential conflicts). This was the problem with the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law's reasonableness inquiry, see Restatement (Third) of Forein Relations Law § 403 (Am. Law Inst. 1987).
3 See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int'l, 493 U.S. 400, 409 (1990)
("The act of state doctrine does not establish an exception for cases and controversies that
may embarrass foreign governments, but merely requires that, in the process of deciding, the
acts of foreign sovereigns taken within their own jurisdictions shall be deemed valid.").
94See Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S.Ct. 1421, 1427 (2012) (holding a dispute was not a
political question without applying the functional factors listed in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 217 (1962), which include concerns about "expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government" and "the potentiality of embarrassment" from many voices
addressing one question); see also id. at 1432 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting the omission of these more prudential concerns from the traditional political question analysis).
95See Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70
U. Colo. L. Rev. 1395, 1396 (1999); Tara Leigh Grove, The Lost History of the Political
Question Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1908 (2015); cf.Harlan Grant Cohen, Formalism and
Distrust: Foreign Affairs Law in the Roberts Court, 83 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 380, 436 (2015)
(describing the Court's apparent worry that "[floreign affairs functionalism.., like the keys
to the family car or no curfew, might just be too much of a temptation').
96 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 164.

97Cf. Knox, supra note 22 (suggesting a similar approach pre-Morrison, though Knox
would interweave this inquiry with the presumption against extraterritoriality, a route Morrison may not have left open).
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that application.98 In addition, this inquiry should be treated as a rare exception to an otherwise strong default. Once a judge has determined that
Congress intended a statute to apply extraterritorially, she should assume
it does apply extraterritorially, at least up to the limits of international
law. Many cases will fall squarely in this zone, without implicating the
gray space at the edges where the thinness of U.S. jurisdictional ties in
fact generate friction and controversy. 99
This is the difference between Morrison, Empagran, and Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., where foreign allies intervened to voice
concerns about the reach of U.S. laws, and RJR Nabisco, where they
themselves invoked the U.S. law. The former cases were "foreigncubed," involving foreign plaintiffs, foreign defendants, and foreign
harms; the reach of U.S. prescriptive jurisdiction under international law
in those cases was at its lowest ebb. In RJR Nabisco, in contrast, "[a]ll
defendants are U.S. corporations, headquartered in the United States,
charged with a pattern of racketeering activity directed and managed
from the United States, involving conduct occurring in the United
States."' 00 As Justice Ginsburg summed up, "this case has the United
States written all over it."' 0 ' The difference in foreign reaction across
these cases was not hypocritical, as the majority delighted in suggesting.l°2 Rather, the reason why RJR Nabisco did not raise international
comity concerns was not because the plaintiffs were the foreign governments themselves, but because the defendants were U.S. citizens operating on U.S. territory.'0 3 In such a case involving traditional and
strong bases for exercising prescriptive jurisdiction under international
law, judges should not shy away from applying extraterritorial laws as
Congress has written them.
The precise contours of this task of statutory interpretation in the gray
zone of jurisdictional conflict, however, still requires refinement. Courts
and commentators have tried and largely discarded the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law's reasonableness balancing test, and
Empagran has rarely been invoked outside the antitrust context. Besides
98 See Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law § 204 cmt. c, at 36 (Am. Law Inst.,

Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016)).
99 Further, the identification of that gray space can be aided by the interventions of the
U.S. government and foreign governments.
100 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2114 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
101
ld. at 2115.
102 See id. at 2107-08 (majority opinion).
103 See Bookman, supra note 52, at 60-61 (raising a similar observation).
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which, the search for congressional intent regarding jurisdictional conflict might be quixotic, as Congress may well never have thought about
the jurisdictional configurations at issue. The solution to that remaining
uncertainty, 04
however, is not avoidance, but engagement and reasoned
elaboration. 1
CONCLUSION

The real challenge in RJR Nabisco was not the hunt for congressional
intent-which was not that hard to find-but the fact that RICO itself is
overbroad. I am not unsympathetic to the majority's concern that extraterritorial application of RICO, just like territorial application of RICO,
could sweep too broadly. But unilateral judicial corrections for unwise
legislation raises more concerns than it resolves. What Congress needs,
if not a faithful agent, is a faithful partner in managing jurisdictional
conflict in a globalized economy. It may now fall to the lower courts to
step into that partnership and nudge the presumption back towards
home.

104
For example, in the context of specific statutes like the Lanham Act and the Bankruptcy
Code that do apply extraterritorially, lower courts have developed "avariety of tests" to limit
those laws' geographic reach. Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law at 38-40
(Am. Law Inst., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016)) (gathering cases).

